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Bus Rapid Transit Systems as a Governance Reform Project 
 
Abstract 
Bus Rapid Transit systems exist in over 206 cities and 45 countries around the world. They are seen 
to provide a much lower cost option of mass mobility than fixed rail or underground systems which 
developing countries struggle to afford. Whilst BRT systems have undoubtedly been seen to be 
successful from a transport system perspective, they are more than a transport system innovation. 
They are often introduced to replace what is seen to be a failing, unsafe and poorly regulated 
informal transit system. This paper therefore focuses on the process of BRT introduction as a 
governance reform. The paper draws on African experience where adoption of BRT has been slow 
relative to South America and South East Asia. Using an in-depth analysis of the introduction of a 
new system in Ghana and data on levels of governance maturity across the African sub-continent, 
the paper finds that to understand BRT implementation requires an understanding of how the 
incumbent transport regime could and will be able to be reorganized. The success of BRT systems 
that result will depend at least as much on how the reforms are achieved as it will on the usual 
design concerns which typically occupy transport planners. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Rapid urbanisation which has characterized developing countries, especially those in Africa, has led 
to several transport challenges such as: 
x rising travel demand, especially in major cities (Rahman et al. 2012); 
x increasing vehicle ownership (Cervero, 1996); 
x safety issues (Obeng et al. 2016; Poku-Boansi & Adarkwa, 2013); 
x congestion (Adarkwa & Poku-Boansi, 2011; Kwakye & Fouracre, 1998); 
x unreliable public transport services (Adarkwa, 2003; Poku-Boansi, 2011); 
x poor and inadequate pedestrian facilities (Amoako et al. 2014); and  
x unscheduled services, indiscipline among public transport operators in terms of 
nonadherence to traffic regulations (Agyemang, 2015; Kwakye & Fouracre, 1998).  
In response to these challenges, most governments in developing countries have initiated steps to 
reform their transport systems with support from multilateral organisations such as the World Bank 
and the African Development Bank (ADB). Within this, Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) has become pre-
eminent as an affordable and effective mass transport system that can be implemented rapidly 
(Hidalgo & Gutierrez, 2013). BRT systems are now in place in 45 countries around the world with 
an estimated 5,542km of lanes in operation (Global BRT Data, 2017). 
 
BRT systems are part of the response to continued rapid urbanization effects ongoing in most 
countries, but particularly, the larger cities in the developing world. Prior to BRT implementation, 
the provision of public transport service is often characterized by the dominance of the informal 
operators who operate minibuses which are individually owned but are highly organised at route 
level through Unions. The vast majority of the travelling public depend on these services to get 
around despite issues with safety, reliability and overcrowding. In examining the implementation of 
several BRT schemes internationally, Kumar et al. (2011: 6) observe that: 
 
´%57V\VWHPVKDYHXQLTXHSODQQLQJDQGLPSOHPHQWation challenges which if not adequately 
addressed up-front, can lead to less than successful outcomes. The introduction of BRT 
systems often requires a need to migrate from a loosely organized public transport sector, to 
one that is regulated and controlled. There is also the need to coordinate activities of the 
multiple agencies involved in planning, financing, implementing, and operating or regulating 
various aspects of the public transport system. There is also often the need to undertake new 
functions QRLQVWLWXWLRQKDVEHHQGRLQJµ 
 
This is not a list of transportation issues but instead, a set of governance challenges. Lindau et al. 
(2013) usefully break down the list of challenges still further, under the two broad headings of 
planning and implementation as shown in Table 1. They conclude that for BRT implementation in 
developing countries, ´PRVW LVVXHVDUH UHODWHG WR LQVWLWXWLRQDO ILQDQFLDO OHJDODQGSROLWLFDO VHFWRUVµ
(Lindau et al. 2013; 9). Despite the apparent importance of governance issues to BRT 
implementation, the available literature pays comparatively little attention to governance. A review 
of the OVID Transport database from 2006 tRIRUDOODUWLFOHVZLWK´%XV5DSLG7UDQVLW·or BRT 
LQ7LWOHµ\LHOGHGDUWLFOHV)URPDUHYLHZRItitles and abstracts of potentially relevant papers, only 
seven had significant discussion of governance issues, which corresponds to less than two percent of 
the articles reviewed. Hidalgo and Carrigan (2010) in studying BRT operations in 13 Latin American 
and Asian cities, have suggested the development of a comprehensive planning process which 
combines financial, legal, institutional and environmental concerns with engineering/ technical 
efforts. They also call for paying careful attention to regulatory/institutional issues, adapting the 
existing regulatory framework if required, and proceeding with special care where the bus 
improvement is to be integrated with an existing system. This is because the BRT system is 
complementary, not a competing element in transport supply. This position has been echoed by 
Cervero (2013), Weinstock et al. (2011) and Wright (2007) who argued that the barriers to planning 
and implementing BRT systems include the political economy, community support, institutional 
capacity and funding. The key areas of focus of research on BRT have been reporting case studies, 
performance (actual or modelled), impacts of design on operation or the impacts of the system on 
land value or other wider policy concerns such as the environment. These issues are clearly 
important but this overlooks the wider importance of governance challenges (see Rizvi & Sclar, 
2013; Paget-Seekins, 2015; Dewey, 2013; Paget-Seekins & Tironi, 2016). 
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
This paper explores the introduction of BRT as a governance reform process to open up new 
understandings into the ways in which governance matters to BRT reform and which, therefore, go 
beyond just acknowledging that governance questions matter. It does so by examining, in depth, the 
process of reform for the introduction of a BRT system in Accra in Ghana. It then broadens the 
analysis beyond Ghana to the wider African continent through an analysis of governance capacity. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 expands further the literature on barriers and 
governance of BRT systems and discusses how the broader governance literature might interpret 
these issues. Section 3 introduces the methodology before Section 4 describes the evolution of 
*KDQD·VWUDQVSRUWV\VWHPWRDUULYHat the current BRT reforms. We develop a hypothesis that, given 
the complexity of the governance reform undertaken, we would expect to see BRT implementation 
happening in other African countries where governance capacity is highest and the need for public 
transport capacity enhancement greatest. Section 5 explores this through data from the World Bank 
Worldwide Governance Indicators of 2016 and other African BRT implementation experience. In 
Section 6, we conclude that it is necessary to see BRT implementation as part of a longer-term 
governance reform process and that, whilst implementation is possible with more limited reforms, it 
could be subject to longer-term risks and much greater potential for poor system performance. BRT 
implementation therefore requires a re-orientation of government as well as of the transport system 
if it is to be a success. 
 
2. BRT and Governance Literature 
 
7UHLEHWDOSVXPPDUL]HJRYHUQDQFHDVWKH´VWHHULQJDQGFR-ordination of interdependent 
(usually collective) actors based on institutionalizHG UXOH V\VWHPVµ %HQ], 2004: 25). This can be 
broken down into three distinct but inter-UHODWHGDUHDV)LUVWLVWKHH[LVWHQFHRIDVHWRI´ODZVUXOHV
judicial decisions and administrative practices that constrain, prescribe and enable the provision of 
publicly supported goods and servicesµ/\QQHWDO7KLV LV W\SLFDOO\H[SDQGHGWR LQFOXGH
informal norms or customs and practices which reflect the fact that not every aspect of how to 
govern is or could be formally codified. Second, is the network of actors involved in decision-
making. It is widely accepted that, whilst state actors retain significant importance, ´WKHERXQGDULHV
between and within the public and private sectors have become blurred. The essence of governance 
is its focus on governance mechanisms that do not rest on recourse to the authority and sanctions of 
JRYHUQPHQWµ, but instead, IRFXVLQJ RQ ´WKH LQWHUDFWLYH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ DQG ZLWKLQ
governmental and non-JRYHUQPHQWDO IRUFHVµ 6WRNHU   7KH final element is to see the 
development of policies as part of D ´PRGH RI SROLWLFDO VWHHULQJµ +HULWLHU  185). Here, the 
introduction of BRT is very much, therefore, part of political steering with the project driving or 
reinforcing the need for a set of complementary institutional reforms (see Finn (2013) for example 
on formalizing management). Paget-Seekins (2015: 116) describes BRT projects as being part of 
´HQWUHSUHQHXULDOXUEDQJRYHUQDQFHµ 
 
The literature on BRT implementation and governance provides some valuable insights into the 
challenges which need to be overcome. Kumar et al. (2012), for example, estimate that in Lagos, 
15% of the population earns a living through the informal transport sector and, therefore, the 
political risk in amending the system is high. They also suggest that incumbents leverage influence 
over politicians and officials, sometimes through corruption. Venter (2013) further develops these 
arguments in highlighting that the informal sector exists as it does to deliberately circumvent labour 
laws and quality regulations. Whilst this is a major source of the supply problems BRT seeks to 
address, it also serves to provide low income groups with an affordable service. Lindau et al. (2013) 
and Mfinanga (2012) suggest that special efforts need to be made to allow existing owners or owner 
operators to participate in the new BRT schemes as they rarely have the working capital or know 
how to form part of these new and larger enterprises. 
 
However, despite the challenges of managing a transition from the informal to the formal sector, 
this has been achieved in different places in different ways. The literature looks at factors which 
support or hinder transition. Lindau et al. (2013: 10) poinWRXWWKDWUHODWLYHWRUDLO´LQZKLFKDVLQJOH
transit agency is usually designated and empowered to plan, implement and operate the full system, 
BRT touches on areas that fall under the purview of a range of city officials in different 
departmentsµ. Rizvi and Sclar (2013) also identify institutional arrangements as important to the 
success of implementation in comparing the Delhi and Ahmedabad BRT implementation. There, 
Delhi was more complex in the institutional arrangements and subject to more variable support for 
the project across agencies and over time. However, particularly important to Rizvi and Sclar was 
the process of implementation rather than just the institutional structures. Without labelling it as 
such, the different studies are examining governance, or the process of steering and co-ordination 
amongst actors.  
 
One further, important, insight which can be gleaned from the current literature is the need to look 
at a longer timeline to study BRT adoption in the form it is adopted in any given place. Wood 
(2015), for example, identifies a cycle of discussion and even failed implementation (2003) in 
Johannesburg before the system was successfully launched in 2009. Venter (2013) makes a similar 
point about a history of previous attempts to reform taxi or public transport markets. BRT 
implementations happen in institutional settings which have a particular history, and this will 
influence whether and how they are implemented. These can be interpreted as the struggles of any 
QHZ¶QLFKH· LQQRYDWLRQ trying to establish itself within the existing network of actors and practices 
that provide mobility within a city (Geels, 2002; Geels & Schot, 2007). The pathway chosen for 
integrating the BRT system with the current informal network centres on the ability of government 
actors to influence and steer (or govern) the existing regime of actors and systems of provision.  
 
3. Methodology 
 
The approach adopted to understanding BRT as a governance reform in this paper is two-fold. The 
first part is an in-depth case study of the development of a new BRT system in Accra, Ghana. The 
case study research has been undertaken over the last quarter of 2016 and first quarter of 2017 with 
the BRT system launching in September 2016. The research was undertaken by an academic familiar 
with the implementation. The primary method was desk top review and analysis of key institutional 
reforms. This was augmented by discussion with five people whose institutions are involved in 
specific aspects of the implementation to clarify key uncertainties. The five were selected from 
Greater Accra Passenger Transport Executive (GAPTE), the Ministry of Local Government and 
Rural Development (MLGRD), and the Department of Urban Roads. The aim of the case study is 
to explore the history of the adoption process but also the extent of complementary institutional 
reform that has accompanied the implementation and the extent to which the BRT scheme has 
reconfigured the actors and actions of the existing regime of transport provision. This work adds to 
the existing, relatively small, body of work in this area. 
 
The second stage in the methodology explored a further question about governance reform. If, as 
the literature suggests, the implementation of BRT is a significant governance reform, then our 
working hypothesis is that BRT should be more likely to happen in places with stronger governance 
capacity. However, the likelihood of implementation will also be a function of the perceived need 
for transport reform which would likely be caused by growing pressure on the existing service 
provision model. The second stage in the methodology therefore explores the relationship between 
strength of governance capacity and a measure of need for mass transit. The measurement of 
governance capacity is taken from the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicator of 2016 
described in Table 2. It is important to acknowledge that this is not a perfect index to deploy by any 
means as it operates at a national scale, whereas implementation may have strong local influence. 
Any index is also subject to criticism about the constructs that comprise it and the ability to measure 
quite different constructs on a common scale. It is however available for all African countries and 
any errors of measurement and constructs seem more likely to mask important nuances that matter 
to implementation than to amplify them. We therefore think that this is a defensible first attempt to 
use the index in this way. The index comprises six areas and for this study, we have simply totaled 
the scores for each area which can vary from -2.5 to +2.5. The respective min and max scores are 
therefore r 15. For need, we used the population of the largest city in a country (or the largest city 
which has implemented a BRT if this is smaller). Other measures such as GDP per capita were 
considered but dismissed as inferior to population. Income related measures, for example, do not 
adequately represent the very unequal distributions of wealth across people and regions within the 
countries concerned. 
 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
4. Ghana BRT implementation 
 
The public transport system in Ghana is typical of that in developing countries in being dominated 
by the informal transport sector. The services provided in the two major cities of Accra and Kumasi 
are operated by individuals through Unions. The modal share in the Greater Accra Metropolitan 
Area (GAMA) is dominated by minibuses and taxis, carrying about 68% of the travelling public. As 
noted in the introduction*KDQD·VLQIRUPDOVHFWRU LVcharacterised by low quality of services, high 
rates of collision and accidents, increased congestion in cities, erratic scheduling and services, 
inadequate capacity, evasion of taxes and fees, weak control and non-adherence to regulation 
(Cervero & Golub, 2007).  
 
To understand why BRT emerged as a solution, and why it has happened now, it is necessary to 
review some of the history of transport reforms in Ghana. In the early 1980s, Ghana went through a 
period of economic recession leading to the government signing up to the IMF/World Bank 
Economic Recovery Programme and the Structural Adjustment Programme in 1983. The 
implementation of these programmes saw a policy shift which affected the transport sector. The 
liberalisation of the market saw a change in the role of government from one of being a provider of 
transport infrastructure and services, to one of creating a market in which the private sector leads in 
the provision of transport services. Subsequently, regulations aimed at safeguarding the interest of 
users and private sector operators were put in place. 
 
In parallel with a shift to liberalization of the transport market, Ghana has been experiencing rapid 
urbanisation and this has come with its associated transport challenges. With an estimated urban 
population of 14 million (Ghana Statistical Service, 2015) accompanied by high incidence of 
urbanisation and natural population increase, Ghana has been experiencing rising travel demand, 
high levels of congestion (see Oteng-Ababio & Agyemang, 2012; Addo, 2005; Kwakye et al. 1997) 
and significant pollution problems brought about by poorly maintained vehicle fleets (see Poku-
Boansi & Adarkwa, 2013), especially in the two major cities of Accra and Kumasi. 
 
These wider pressures create an environment where a change to transport provision is seen as 
desirable. Transport reforms have also been a goal also of key development partners to Ghana. As 
part of a reform package established in 1998 (Kwakye & Fouracre, 1998), an initial proposal to 
establish higher quality public transport provision was made. This led to an initial limited BRT 
system which was implemented but subsequently failed. The Metro Mass Transit Limited (MMTL), 
established in October 2003 to offer intracity, intercity and long distance transport, attempted to 
introduce a BRT system on the 20km Kinbu ² Adenta corridor in Accra in September 2005 
(Agyemang, 2015). The project started with twelve (12) buses with the Department of Urban Roads 
delineating the outer lane of the existing Kinbu ² Adenta corridor for the exclusive use of the buses 
(Agyemang, 2015). However, compliance of the right-of-way provision was seldom enforced 
$J\HPDQJ  DQG GXH WR RWKHU LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ FKDOOHQJHV VXFK DV JRYHUQPHQW·V inability to 
provide the needed infrastructure, non-enforcement of regulations and stiff opposition from 
operators in the informal sector, the pilot BRT system was suspended in 2007 even though there 
was some initial success in ridership (Agyemang, 2015). This suggests that the implementation of the 
infrastructure and provision of the buses were not sufficient conditions for the system to become an 
established part of the existing transport regime. 
  
Despite the initial failure, the government of Ghana did not give up in reforming the public 
transport system. Subsequently, both the National Transport Policy (2008) and the Transport Sector 
Medium-term Development Plan (2012²2014) which guide the implementation of the government 
of Ghana transport policy objectives have aimed to prioritise and supporting the development of 
transit systems in Ghana. Discussion with officials of the Ghana Urban Transport Project (GUTP) 
revealed that following the failure of the initial BRT system, the following factors served as drivers 
for trying again with the reforms: 
x recurring traffic congestion; 
x passengers' perceptions of inadequate comfort and personal security on the current system; 
x the continuous support of the World Bank; and  
x the prospect of securing other funding such as the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) 
and the Agence Francaise de Developpment (AFD). 
The history of multiple approaches to introducing BRT has some echoes of the South African 
approach (Wood, 2015) although in Ghana, an initial system was brought in to operation. 
The government of Ghana thus started the process of tackling these challenges through the GUTP 
which was established in 2007. The GUTP is funded by the Government of Ghana, the World 
Bank, the AFD and the GEF. It seeks among other things to provide an affordable, safe and 
efficient urban transport system that supports the overall development and competitiveness of 
FRXQWU\·VXUEDQDUHD7KH LPSOHPHQWDWLRQRI WKH*873 VLJQLILHVDPDMRU UHIRUP LQ WKH WUDQVSRUW
system of Ghana and includes regulatory and institutional development, the introduction of a BRT 
system and the development of improved minibus and taxi services in the major cities of the country 
starting with the two major cities of Accra and Kumasi. 
 
The GUTP empowered the Metropolitan, Municipal, District Assemblies (MMDAs) to perform 
urban transport functions and improve public transportation in their jurisdictions. GUTP has two 
key objectives: 
i. to improve mobility through a combination of strategies and implementation of BRT 
system; and  
ii. to promote more environmentally sustainable transport modes and lower transport related 
GHG emissions. 
As a policy, the government has set a target for 80% of all trips made in the major urban areas in 
Ghana to be done through public mass transit systems by 2035 (Ministry of Transport, 2016). In 
realizing this vision, the government has developed several strategies as shown in Table 3.  
 
Insert Table 3 here 
 
As can be seen in Table 3, the BRT reforms are taking place as part of a broader set of institutional 
reforms which include decentralization of competences and power to metropolitan areas, the 
establishment of a new regulatory body and the formalization of larger bus companies. The key 
institutional reforms are now described with a view to understanding why particular reforms were 
undertaken in the way that they were. 
 
4.1. Centre for Urban Transportation 
 
The government of Ghana, through Parliament in 2010 passed Act 799 establishing a Centre for 
Urban Transportation (CUT) to serve as a centre of expertise in urban transportation. The CUT has 
a governing body with representation from national organisations such as the Drivers and Vehicle 
Licensing Authority, academia, the private sector and transport operators. The CUT has 23 
functions which can be synthesised into conducting evidence based research to inform policy, 
promote innovation within the urban transportation system, collaborate with stakeholders (e.g. 
MMDAs) and monitor and ensure the performance of public bodies, agencies and organisations in 
relation to the use of services received from the Centre. As can be seen in Figure 1, the CUT is a 
body under the central government providing technical support to the MLGRD. After three years of 
functioning, the CUT has become defunct. However, steps have begun to reconstitute the CUT. 
Funding for the CUT per Act 799 will come from parliamentary grants, fees from services and other 
international or national grants and donations. This is a crucial element for capacity development 
which, as Lindau et al. (2013) note, is often lacking due to the institutional history which tends to be 
focused on road construction and concentrated at a national rather than city level. 
 
Insert Figure 1 here 
 
4.2 Ghana Private Transport Executives 
 
The ongoing reforms have seen a structural change in the management of public transport system in 
the GAMA with the establishment of the Greater Accra Passenger Transport Executive (GAPTE) 
to facilitate the management and the execution of the public transport reforms in the participating 
MMDAs. As seen in Figure 1, GAPTE is a unit established to plan and manage public transport 
functions that are cross-jurisdictional. It is a functionally specific body (Hooghe and Marks, 2001) 
but one which is held to account by the Chief Executives of the twelve participating MMDAs who 
serve as the Board of GAPTE. Apart from legal authority, GAPTE represents the executive arm 
with governance and representation from the participating MMDAs. GAPTE is thus accountable to 
the twelve participating MMDAs. GAPTE is mandated to undertake public transport planning, 
public transport regulation and enforcement, develop bus priority measures, bus support 
infrastructure and overall system management. The idea to as much as possible bring the 
management task under a central control is in line with the belief of transport institutional reforms 
(Shafritz et al. 2009) and to avoid duplication of efforts. This will provide a framework with strong 
direction and planning at the centre (Low & Astle, 2009). GAPTE has being established as a 
Company limited by Guarantee under the Companies Act, 1963, Act 179 and structured into the 
three departments, Network Development, Operations and Corporate Services Departments (see 
Table 4). Currently, GAPTE receives funding for infrastructure work, bus purchase and its planning 
activities direct from the national government through the Department of Urban Roads and the 
MLGRD. In the medium to long term, GAPTE will be funded through MMDAs contribution from 
revenues generated from direct public transport activities (such as permits, sticker and parking fees), 
commuter user charges, fees from the issuance of operating permits, track access charges, depot user 
charges and advertising on buses and infrastructure. GAPTE collects the bus lease fees and 
distributes the remaining smart ticket income to the operators and for the repayment of the loan 
guaranteed by the national government for the purchase of the buses. 
 
Insert Table 4 here 
 
4.3 Ghana BRT system 
 
In September 2016, a BRT system, popularly referred to as Aayalolo, was launched on a pilot basis 
in the GAMA. The US$ 95 million project seeks to address the many challenges associated with the 
provision of public transport services. The 22.3km line which is a bus-based BRT system, forms part 
of a network consisting of six lines designed to deliver fast, comfortable and cost effective urban 
public transport services in the twelve districts covering an area of 1,494.4 km2 ² approximately 
40.4% of the Greater Accra Region. A total of 245 Scania BRT Buses have been procured through a 
loan guaranteed by the government of Ghana for the bus companies who are expected to pay for 
them during operation. The repayment as indicated earlier is done through GAPTE who retain a 
proportion of the fares collected for the servicing of the loan. Each bus has a maximum occupancy 
of eighty-six (86) passengers and is equipped with an electronic ticketing system, GPS receptors, on-
board computers, closed-circuit television (CCTV) and communications systems.  
 
The BRT system when completed will have a total of 163.7km and will represent the longest 
network in Africa. The six BRT routes will be serviced by twelve arterial bus routes totaling 168.3km 
with the longest route being about 43.8km (Ashaiman ² Ring Road). The proposed BRT system in 
Ghana is designed to provide separate roles for existing minibus and taxi operators within a 
¶XQLYHUVDOQHWZRUN· VHH)LJXUH2). This universal network is fashioned around the hub and spoke 
strategy where the ¶hXEV·are the existing informal minibus (trotro) terminals expected to become the 
major terminals. These hubs will serve as the medium of carrying the travelling public from 
residential areas to the minor and local distributors using the existing informal services. Other bus 
stations and small sized terminals located along minor and local distributor roads within residential 
neighbourhoods have been designed to serve as the "spoke" of the system, serving small and 
medium capacity transit modes which will feed the BRTs operating on the major arterial routes. The 
use of the universal network system is to make provision for separate roles for the proposed bus 
services and the existing trotros and taxis operators in the network and to deal with agitations 
because of the fear of losing livelihoods (Venter et al. 2013; Dibetle, 2009; McLachlan, 2010). Even 
though the system allows for varied roles, all existing trotros and taxis will operate but under permit 
to enable them provide feeder services to the BRT system. 
 
Insert Figure 2 here 
 
Operations along the pilot Amasaman ² Tudu corridor have being designed into three operational 
routes with three different Bus Operators, all private sector companies responsible for operating the 
buses and depot management. These companies were created out of the existing informal bus and 
minibus operator unions operating along the route where the BRT system operates. Table 5 presents 
the schedule of each of the operators and assigned colour. 
 
Insert Table 5 here 
 
Payment for the service is done using e-cards through an automatic fare collection system which 
ensures a cashless system. A zonal fare structure which allows for graduation of fares paid per 
distance travelled is applied with fare levels ranging from GHS 1.20 to GHS 3 (GHS 1 = US$ 0.2243 
- based on March 2, 2018), equivalent with the minibus fares for similar routes along the corridor. 
Benchmarking the fares charged with that of existing trotro operators according to an official of 
GAPTE was to make the service competitive and to attract passengers, especially at the early stages 
of their operations. What remains to be seen is whether the current rates will be able to sustain the 
operations. 
 
4.6 Governance Reform 
 
Reflecting back on the definition of governance earlier, we can see BRT as a mode of political 
steering in so far as the necessity of BRT to achieve the modal share targets brought with it a raft of 
requirements for other institutional reforms. The way in which the reforms were designed reflected 
the network of actors and, in particular, as found in other case studies, the incumbent operators. It is 
difficult to imagine, for example, the configuration of services in Table 5 emerging from a blank 
sheet of paper system design exercise. However, whilst that shaped the way in which the companies 
and franchises were formed, it was only a part of the wider story of institutional reform which 
covered rules, laws and structures at different scales. The absence of governance reform was seen to 
be a contributory factor to the failed 2003 implementation. 
 
The scale of institutional change instigated for this BRT reform compared with the 2003 reform is 
significant. Taken together, we estimate that, excluding the individual trotro operators that form part 
of the BRT operations, there are nine (9) organisations or institutions involved in designing, 
developing and delivering the BRT system of which four (4) are new ² 2 newly established (i.e. 
GAPTE and CUT) and 2 existing but new to the project (MMDAs and MLGRD). The operations 
of these institutions are guided by legislations and bylaws passed by the MMDAs. There are twelve 
new rules and regulations that have been necessary to make this possible. This has covered all 
aspects of defining the routes, permits, operating rights, quality and enforcement. Of particular 
interest is the passing up of powers to GAPTE from the MMDAs. This seems a necessary condition 
on transport grounds due to the routes crossing boundaries but also from a skills perspective where 
the MMDAs would struggle to each manage such a complex range of tasks. This has been further 
augmented by the creation of the Department of Transportation as part of the decentralised 
departments of the local government system. 
 
This is truly the story of a major set of governance reforms as well as a new transportation system. It 
is, however, early days in the implementation to know whether the reforms will deliver their 
intentions. Ridership data suggest a steady increase in the volume of passengers carried by the BRT 
(see Table 6 for details). The total number of passenger carried on the pilot corridor has increased 
from 42,491 as at December 2016 to 133,694 by the end of July 2017. This increase is also seen in 
the average passenger per day where the December 2016 average was 1,416 compared to the July 
2017 average of 7,427. Despite the gradual increase in ridership, it will be difficult to attribute that to 
the governance reforms put in place. This is because, formal institutions change at point in time but 
the governance processes which flow out from these changes, emerge over time. The success of the 
reforms will depend, in part, on the BRT system replacing trotro services for the main trunk routes 
and being fed by them at the key terminals and the necessary regulatory and enforcement roles 
supporting this as envisaged by the government of Ghana (Ministry of Transport, 2016). Other 
factors such as the ability of the operators to cover the costs of the fleet renewal whilst holding fares 
at the same levels as parallel informal services seem challenging. Of particular interest will be the 
extent to which reforms for future corridors occur and whether, if they do they follow the same 
model as the pilot corridor or develop the reforms further. This will be an indicator of where power 
lies within the system between the state and the private transport operators. 
 
5. Governance Capacity 
 
As highlighted in sections 1 and 3, given the scale of the institutional rearrangements to make the 
BRT implementation possible, the BRT project can be seen as a major governance reform. We 
hypothesized that this is most likely to happen in countries where there is both a level of need for 
mass transit system reform and the necessary governmental capacity to do so. Figure 3 shows the 
plot of need (measured by size of largest city or largest city in a country with BRT operations taken 
from a city population website)1 against the composite World Bank Index of governance. The 
figures used for governance capacity are 2015, unless a BRT system has been implemented in which 
case, the year of implementation is used. 
 
Insert Figure 3 here 
 
With only four implementing countries, it is important not to read too much into the data. There are 
other influences such as political leadership and the different importance of city priorities in 
different contexts that can explain why systems may have been implemented. Nonetheless, South 
Africa and Ghana are the two countries with both significant population growth pressures and 
positive levels of governance capacity that have implemented BRT reforms. Tanzania and Nigeria 
feature more strongly on the need scale but score much less highly on the governance capacity. This 
                                                          
1 www.citypopulation.de/africa  
has some read across to the strength of the associated reforms that have accompanied BRT 
implementation as shown in Table 7. 
 
Insert Table 7 here 
 
Of particular note is the substantially more advanced reforms to the reorganization of existing 
provision which has been achieved in South Africa and Tanzania. This forms part of the Ghanaian 
reform process but the reconfigured private sector operators seem to have influenced the system 
configuration and trotro competition has not yet been eliminated. The Lagos BRT corridor in 
Nigeria has been open since 2008 but has not expanded which suggests an on-going lack of 
commitment or capacity to further implement transport system reforms.  
 
Ghana is also different from the other reforms in Africa as the newly created agency (GAPTE) that 
is implementing the BRT is situated outside the local government structure. The success of this 
model remains to be seen during implementation but there is a greater degree of influence of a new 
agency and of the Union led operators in the Ghana model. We have shown that this results from 
the history of previous attempts at reform.  
 
If the evidence put forward here lends confidence to the importance of governance capacity to the 
successful implementation of BRT, then it could have implications for the countries bounded by the 
dashed grey shape on Figure 3 which appear to be closest to the most recent sites of implementation 
in terms of need and governance capacity (Senegal, Tunisia, Morocco, Côte D'Ivoire and Kenya). 
We tentatively suggest the approach adopted here is helpful in understanding where might be 
suitable next and that, improving the governance systems might be a necessary pre-cursor to 
accelerating the adoption of these solutions. However, as all but the Lagos system are relatively new 
in their implementation and the full maturity of the governance reforms remains unclear, we are 
unable to be definitive. We would also suggest that it is not simply sufficient to look at governance 
capacity at a national scale as, it is clear from the Ghanaian case study, the ability of local 
government to reform to incorporate new structures and processes is equally critical. Indeed, it is the 
nexus of national-local and public-private which seems critical, which points more generally to calls 
for greater attention to be given to multi-level governance challenges (Hooghe & Marks, 2001; 
Ahluwalia, 2017). 
 6. Conclusion 
 
Whilst institutional issues have been identified as critically important to the effective adoption of 
BRT systems, the overwhelming majority of research attention on BRT is to the design and wider 
system impacts. This study, through an in-depth examination of the implementation of BRT in 
Ghana, has demonstrated that as well as being a transport project, BRT is in fact a stimulus for 
wider governance reforms. Without such reforms, the ability of BRT to challenge the dominance of 
the informal sector is threatened. 
 
This paper has explored BRT development in Ghana and, to a lesser degree, the three other 
implementing African countries. We tentatively conclude that, as a major governance reform, the 
wider institutional reforms have been more comprehensively addressed in countries with a generally 
higher level of governance capacity in Africa. A willingness to devolve transport responsibilities 
from national to local bodies and the creation of structures which can govern across boundaries 
within and outside the main urban areas seem important elements of the reforms. This has also been 
accompanied with long recognized capacity building efforts. All of these elements were absent in the 
previous failed reform in Ghana. Whilst the construction of BRT schemes is rapid and can happen, 
without such a comprehensive set of reforms, as in Nigeria, the need for more substantial 
governance changes and the establishment of new institutions can perhaps explain why African 
cities have not been rapid adopters of BRT. Through a preliminary analysis of governance capacity 
across Africa there are many countries which seem unlikely to be in a position to effect such reforms 
currently, although we have tentatively identified some potential next adopters on the basis of 
transport need and relatively higher governance capacity. 
 
This work has reinforced previous calls to pay greater attention to institutional issues surrounding 
BRT reform. Here we have focused on adoption, but the field would benefit from much greater 
clarity about the extent to which different reforms impact on the operational success of the systems. 
Creating new institutions happens slowly and so knowing which specific institutional changes seem 
to matter most could help other countries streamline their reforms and accelerate adoption. It would 
also be useful to understanding, through richer comparative research, the importance of local 
cultural and historic reasons for structures being as they are and how these in-turn impact on the 
types of reforms seen to be possible and actually realized. The time span over which the Ghanaian 
case unfolded was more than three decades and relates to broader reform agendas such as 
liberalization and modernization of the economy (Ulli-Beers, 2013) well beyond the transport sector. 
 
This work has focused on BRT implementation in Africa. Institutional arrangements and questions 
of governance will apply in other contexts and the findings here may have some applicability 
elsewhere. However, context matters to governance, and we would therefore caution against direct 
transfer of the findings, but instead suggest that this paper acts as a stimulus to broadening the 
understanding of the ways in which governance matters to BRT reform in different places. 
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Table 1 - Planning and Implementation Barriers  
Planning Barriers Implementation Barriers 
Institutional complexities and lack of 
technical capacity 
Underestimating the implementation effort, 
i.e. optimism bias. 
Lack of alignment among stakeholders Discontinuities due to political cycles 
Strong promotion of competing modes Lack of national policies supporting BRT 
Development 
Perception of BRT as a lower quality 
mode 
Insufficient funding for adequate 
implementation 
Traditional bias towards vehicle capacity 
expansions 
Rushed inauguration 
Opposition from existing bus operators  
Lack of community participation  
Source: Lindau et al. (2014) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 - World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators 
Area Description 
Voice and Accountability Reflects perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens 
are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as 
freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free 
media. 
Political Stability and 
Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism 
Measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability 
and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism. 
Government Effectiveness Reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality 
of the civil service and the degree of its independence from 
political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government's 
commitment to such policies. 
Regulatory Quality Reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to 
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that 
permit and promote private sector development. 
Control of Corruption Reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms 
of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and 
private interests. 
Rule of Law Reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in 
particular, the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, 
the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence. 
Source: Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay & M. Mastruzzi (2010).  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 3 - Status of implementation of strategies  
Strategies Status Remarks 
Provide urban public transport 
infrastructure On-going  
28 projects: 17 ongoing with varied 
completion levels and 11 projects earmarked 
for future development 
Provide a decentralized 
institutional and regulatory 
framework 
Completed  
LI 1961 passed and the Department of 
Transport (DoT) integrated into the MMDAs. 
The MMDAs have promulgated bye-laws to 
regulate urban passenger transport services. 
Empower the private sector to 
invest in buses and transport 
service provision 
On-going  
Re-organisation of the individual operators 
into formal companies has been done to 
provide an avenue for the private sector to 
invest in bus services. 
Integrate urban transportation 
within a broader urban 
development framework 
On-going 
The DoT forms part of the MMDAs units in 
preparing and implementing the Medium-
Term Development Plans. 
Reorganize existing transport 
operators into business entities to 
deliver urban public transport 
services 
Completed  
Three (3) Quality Bus Companies have been 
formed to provide services 
Ensure that operators comply 
with government regulation and 
provide higher quality service 
Completed  
GAPTE to plan, regulate and manage public 
transport services  
Source: Ministry of Transport (2016). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 4 - Departments and Functions of the GAPTE  
Department Positions Functions 
Network Development 
Department 
Transport Planning and 
Research 
Leads and facilitates the development of public transport services such as data 
gathering, transport network design, forecasting and network integration. It will 
assist the appropriate MDAs, MMDAs and transport operators to develop efficient, 
sustainable and flexible public transport services. It will be responsible for leading 
and shaping the whole public transport system in GAMA. 
Network Planner 
Transport Infrastructure 
Bus Operations 
Management 
Department 
Regulations and Permit 
Responsible for the overall management and general administration of the core 
operations of regulating public transport. Ensure safe and efficient movement 
within GAMA. It will develop the mobility requirements and express this in terms 
of a network, routes, detailed timetables and/or service parameters for public 
transport patrons and operators. Responsible for the development, adaption and 
express of transport policies, establish and manage the processes for regulation and 
enforcement of public transport, bus services management and customer care. 
Monitoring & Enforcement 
(with support from the 
Motor Traffic Department of 
the Ghana Police Service) 
Bus Operations Management 
Corporate Services 
Marketing & Corporate 
Communications 
Responsible for rendering to GAPTE and the public, high quality administrative, 
financial and support services needed to enhance public passenger transport 
services  
Legal Service 
Finance & Admin 
IT 
Support Staff 
(Administrative, Accounts 
and Human Resource 
Officers) 
Internal Audit Internal Auditor 
To review, recommend and implement internal control systems. Helps GAPTE 
accomplish effective financial practices, risk management, control and governance 
processes 
Source: Extracted from the Report on Organizational Framework and Structures for GAPTE, 2013 
 
Table 5 - Schedule of operations of Bus Companies  
Route  Operator Colour Schedule of Operations 
Amasaman ² 
Tudu 
Ghana Co-
Operative Bus 
Rapid Transit 
Services Limited 
 
Green Colour  x Semi-fast service taking Expressway 
x Serving end-to-end movements and 
the important interchanges at 
Achimota and Circle 
x 16 Stops (Inbound and Outbound) 
Ofankor - Tudu Accra GPRTU 
Rapid Bus Services 
Limited 
 
Blue Colour  x Stopping service taking service lane 
x Serving intermediate demand between 
Ofankor and Achimota 
x 17 Stops (Inbound) and 16 Stops 
(Outbound)  
Achimota - 
Tudu  
 
Amalgamated Bus 
Rapid Transit 
Services Limited 
Charcoal Colour  x 6HUYLQJ DV HIILFLHQW ¶VKXWWOH· IRU WKH
demand interchanging and originating 
from Achimota towards Central Accra  
x 12 Stops (Inbound) and 10 Stops 
(Outbound) 
Source: Ministry of Transport (2016). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Ridership data of the Pilot corridor 
Months Number 
of Days 
Average 
passenger 
per day 
Average 
bus trips 
per day 
Total 
passengers 
Total kilometers 
travelled per day 
December 2016 30 1,416 134 42,491 89,866 
January 2017 25 3,274 297 81,848 113,748 
February 2017 24 4,483 316 107,603 112,767 
March 2017 27 5,417 322 146,250 140,503 
April 2017 24 6,137 348 147,289 139,254 
May 2017 25 7,316 388 182,905 163,041 
June 2017 25 7,499 398 187,482 169,369 
July 2017 25 7,427 341 183,998 151,380 
August 2017 27 7,360 370 205.209 174,638 
September 2017 24 7,600 380 204,091 145,651 
Source: GAPTE, 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Status of Implementation 
Parameters  Ghana (Accra) Nigeria (Lagos) South Africa (Cape Town) Tanzania (Dar er Salaam) 
Open or Closed 
system 
System is opened with feeder 
buses plying the same route as 
BRT buses in most sections of 
the route. There are only few 
areas along the corridor that 
the BRT buses have exclusive 
lanes. 
System is closed as dedicated BRT 
infrastructure along the corridor is used 
exclusively by BRT buses. However, there are 
few sections without non-dedicated 
infrastructure leading to feeder and BRT buses 
plying the same road space (Keanzig et al. 
2010) 
System is closed with BRT buses 
plying dedicated routes (Venter, 
2013; Ugo, 2014). 
System is closed with BRT 
buses plying dedicated routes 
.D·EDQJHHWDO 
Operators of the 
system 
Private operators Operated by Lagos Metropolitan Area 
Transport Authority  
Operated by Local Government 
Authority 
Operated by Local 
Government Authority 
Management of 
system 
Managed by the local 
governments through 
GAPTE  
Managed by Lagos Metropolitan Area 
Transport Authority (LAMATA) (Keanzig et 
al. 2010). 
Managed by Metropolitan 
Authorities. Example, MyCiti Bus 
services by the City of Cape 
Town (Ugo, 2014) 
Managed by Surface and 
Marine Transport Authority 
680$75$ .D·EDQJH HW DO
2014). 
Procurement of 
bus fleets and 
payment 
arrangement 
National government 
provided support to private 
operators to acquire fleet. 
Payment will be done using 
proceeds from operations 
Private operators procured the fleets. Example, 
The National Union of Road Transport 
Workers upgraded their ailing vehicle fleets 
and acquired 100 new, standard, high-floor 
buses for use. Lagbus also acquired an 
additional 120 buses (Keanzig et al. 2010). 
National government·s re-
capitalisation programme helped 
in procurement fleets (Venter, 
2013) 
Create a competitive 
environment where the 
private sector will invest in the 
provision of public transport 
VHUYLFHV.D·EDQJHHWDO 
System 
integrated with 
feeder services 
System does not allow 
passengers to purchase tickets 
(or pay fare) on a feeder all the 
way to the city centre 
System does not allow passengers to purchase 
tickets (or pay fare) on a feeder all the way to 
the city centre (Keanzig et al. 2010). 
System does not allow passengers 
to purchase tickets (or pay fare) 
on a feeder all the way to the city 
centre 
System does not allow 
passengers to purchase tickets 
(or pay fare) on a feeder all the 
way to the city centre 
Status of existing 
transport 
operators  
E[LVWLQJWURWURV·FRPSHWHZLWK
BRT buses on pilot corridor 
Existing mini- and midibuses operate on the 
feeder network but compete with the BRT 
buses on certain segment of the roads 
(Keanzig et al 2010). 
Registration of existing operators 
(including those operating 
without permits) to provide 
feeder services to the BRT buses 
(Venter, 2013). 
Dar es Salaam Commuter Bus 
Owners Association provides 
feeder services to BRT buses 
thus eliminate competition. 
Other notable 
institutional 
changes 
Department of Transport 
created as a department of the 
MMDAs 
Creating the Lagos State Traffic Management 
Authority differ from the case of Ghana where 
the power to control primary traffic and 
enforcement is the responsibility of the Motor 
Traffic Department of the Ghana Police 
Service.  
The government of Ghana has 
not been able to decrease 
destructive competition between 
modes unlike the case in South 
Africa 
The use of Traffic Police 
Department to enforce rules 
and regulations (.D·EDQJH HW
al. 2014) is similar to that of 
Ghana. 
Source: Extracted from Keanzig et al. (2010); 9HQWHU.D·EDQJHHWDO8JR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 Figure 1: Institutional Framework for Reform 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Firm lines depict a command communication channel  
whiles broken lines depicts a consultative command channel 
 
 
 
 
 
Ministry of Local Government 
and Rural Development 
Metropolitan, Municipal and 
District Assemblies (12 
Participating MMDAs) 
Center for Urban 
Transportation (CUT) 
Greater Accra Passenger Transport 
Executive (GAPTE) 
Quality Bus Companies (E.g. Accra GPRTU 
Rapid Bus Services Limited, Amalgamated Bus 
Rapid Transit Services Limited & Ghana Co-
Operative Bus Rapid Transit Services Limited 
 
 Figure 2 - The Public Transport Network System 
 
Source: Ministry of Transport, 2016 
Figure 3 - Need against Governance Capacity in Africa 
 
 
Note: Countries bounded in dashed grey shape are those closest to the most recent sites of 
implementation in terms of need and governance capacity. 
Senegal 
Morocco 
Tunisia Kenya 
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